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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE STATE OF UTAH
NEW PARK MINING COMPANY
and PACIFIC EMPLOYERS IN-SURANCE COMPANY,
Appellants,
-

vs.-

INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH and LLOYD REMUND,
Minor son of CHARLES L. RE.MUND, Deceased.
Respondents.

Appellants'
Brief
Case No.

8121

This Appeal is from an Order of the Industrial Com-mission of Utah, in favor of Lloyd Remund (one of the
respondents herein) and against New Park Mining Com-pany and Pacific Employers Insurance Company ( appel-lants herein). New Park Mining Company and Pacific
Employers Insurance Company, will hereinafter be re-ferred to as appellants and defendant, Lloyd Remund,
will sometimes hereinafter be referred to as respondent.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The New Park Mining Company is a Nevada Cor-poration, qualified to do business in the State of Utah,
with its principal place of business at Keetley, Wasatch
County, State of Utah, and at all times herein mentioned,
was an employer subject to the Workmen's Compensation
Act of the State of Utah, and at all times herein mentioned,
carried its workmen's compensation and occupational
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disease coverage with Pacific Employers Insurance Com..
pany, a company lawfully engaged in the writing of work.men's compensation and occupational disease coverage in
the State of Utah. The ·controversy herein involved, arises
out of the death of Charles L. Remund which occurred
on August 21, 1951, following an injury which occurred
on July 25, 1951, said accident arising out of and in the
course of his employment while working for New Park
Mining Company.
The deceased was survived by his wife, Lottie Re..
mund and one son, Lloyd Remund, the respondent here.in, who was sixteen years of age at the time of his father's
death, having been born December 19, 1934. (SR1,
SR4).
Thereafter, based upon the admissions of the ap.pellants, the Industrial Commission issued its Order dated
October 22, 1951, wherein the New Park Mining Com.pany and Pacific Employers Insurance Company were
ordered to pay,
"to applicant, Lottie Remund, for the use and
benefit of herself and Lloyd Remund, compensation
at the rate of $28.88 per week, beginning August
22, 1951, and continuing through December 18,
1952, thereafter at the rate of $27.50 per week,
until a total amount of $8,080.44 compensation at
both rates has been paid." (SR 4).
Compensation was paid to Lottie Remund by the
Pacific Employers Insurance Company in accordance with
the Order of the Commission until September 14, 1953,
inclusive. The compensation rate was $28.88 per week
until December 18, 1952, inclusive, the day before Lloyd
Remund became eighteen years of age, and thereafter at
the reduced rate of $27.50 (SR 4).
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On October 5, 1953, the Industrial Commission of
Utah, without formal hearing and without having taken
additional evidence, issued its Order wherein it is recited
that the above mentioned Lottie Remund, widow of
Charles L. Remund,
"was on the 1st day of September, 1953, married
to Karl Batty, Heber City, Utah, and it further
appearing that Lottie Remund (Batty) has re-ceived compensation in the amount of $3,065.81,
and inasmuch as she has remarried, she is entitled
under the terms of Section 35.-1--73, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953, to one--third of the unpaid
balance of $5,014.63, or $1,671.56 in a lump sum,
the remaining two--thirds of said balance to be paid
to Lloyd Remund, Heber City, Utah, who was de-pendent upon Charles L. Remund, at the time of
his injury and death." (R 1).
The said Order of the Commission further required the
"New Park Mining Company and/or the Pacific
Employers Insurance Company to pay Lottie Re.mund Batty, $1,671.56 in a lump sum."
The Order further required payment of
"the balance of the award to Lloyd Remund at the
rate of $18.33, beginning September 14, 1953, and
every two weeks thereafter until $3,343.07 has been
paid." (R 1).
The New Park Mining Company and Pacific Em-ployers Insurance Company on the 29th day of October,
1953, filed with the Industrial Commission of Utah, an
Application and Motion for Rehearing as to that portion
of the Commission's Order requiring the payment of com-pensation to Lloyd Remund, (R 3) which was denied by
the Commission on the 9th day of November, 1953.
(R 6, 7, 8).
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. , There is no dispute as to that part of the Commis.ston s Order which required compensation to be paid to
Lottie Remund Batty. There has been paid to her, the
sum of $1,671.56 in accordance with the Order of the
Industrial Commission. (R 2).
The Appeal is from the Order of the Commission
only as it directs and orders compensation to be paid to
Lloyd Remund, now nineteen years of age.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. The Decision of the Industrial Commission is Con-trary to Law.
A. Dependency Awards may be Changed or Re-duced after the Original Order.
B. In Ordinary Cases Dependency Ceases at Age
Eighteen.
C. There must be Evidence of Actual Dependency
if Dependency is Claimed /or Children over
the Age of Eighteen Years.
ARGUMENT
Dependency Awards may be Changed or Re-duced after the Original Order.
In order to avoid misunderstanding as to appellants'
position, it is herewith stated: Appellants have not and
do not now take the position that in dependency cases
in which the dependents are a widow and several chil-dren under the age of eighteen years, or in which there
are several young children only, that the unit award must
be reduced proportionally as the widow or children marry,
reach the age of eighteen or dependeney ceases. Appel..
lants do, however, contend that under the particular facts
and circumstances existing in the case now under con..
sideration, that dependency has ceased and that compensa..
tion payments to Lloyd Remund should be discontinued.

A.
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The facts briefly stated are that the deceased left sur-viving him, a wife and a son who, at the time of his
father's death, was a few months under seventeen years
of age. The widow remarried and under the provisions
of Section 35--1--73, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, she was
entitled to and did receive "113 of the benefits remaining
unpaid at the time of such remarriage." At the time of
the widow's remarriage, the son was over the age of
eighteen years. The position taken by the appellants, under
these specific facts, is that the son, now over eighteen
years of age, is not entitled to compensation as he is over
the presumptive age of dependency and being over the
age under which dependency is presumed, there must be
evidence of his physical or mental incapacity or evidence
of other facts upon which the Commission might find
him to be a dependent in fact.
Had the widow not remarried or had there been
other children under eighteen years of age, there would
be no basis for this appeal.
As far as is known, the question raised in this ap-peal has not been before the Supreme Court of the State
of Utah.
The Industrial Commission by its Order dated Octo-ber 22, 1951, found that at the time of the injury sus-tained by Charles L. Remund, that there were dependent
upon him, "Lottie Remund, his wife, and Lloyd Remund,
born December 19, 1934, his son." ( SR 4). The Order
required the payment of $8,080.44 as compensation. Al-though the Order does not so state, it would appear that
the sum of $8,080.44 includes $8,000.00 as the basic
award and $80.44 as the additional 5 o/o allowed for Lloyd
Remund until he reached the age of eighteen years.
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A question which presents itself is whether once the
Industrial Commission has made its findings as to de ..
pendency in a case such as this one, may the so called
unit award be reduced by subsequent events. Appellants
submit that there should be a review and amendment by
the Industrial Commission of the original Order award ..
ing compensation if there are subsequent changing events
and conditions.
The pertinent part of Section 35 . . 1. . 73 which relates
to death benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Act, is as follows:
"35 . . 1. .73. Benefits in case of Death.-Distribution
of award to dependents ..Death of dependents.. Re. .
marriage of widow . ... Should any dependent of
a deceased employee die during the period cover.ed by such weekly payments, the right of such de . .
pendent to compensation under this title shall
cease. Should a widow, who is the sole dependent
of a deceased employee and who is receiving the
benefits of this title, remarry during the period
covered by such weekly payments, her sole right
after such remarriage, to further payments of com..
pensation shall be the right to receive in a lump
sum 1/3 of the benefits remaining unpaid at the
time of such remarriage. Should a widow, who is
a dependent but not the sole dependent of a de..
ceased employee, remarry during the period cover..
ed by such weekly payments she shall be entitled
to receive in a lump sum 1!3 of the benefits remain..
ing unpaid at the time of such remarriage and the
remaining 2/3 of such benefits shall be paid to such
person as the commission may determine, for the
use and benefit of the other dependents, the weekly
benefits to be paid at intervals of not less than four
weeks." (Emphasis ours).
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The above statute provides that the remaining two-thirds of the unpaid compensation, after payment to the
widow upon her remarriage, shall be paid for the use and
benefit of the other dependents.
The requirement that the remaining two--thirds of
the unpaid compensation should be paid to the other
dependents presupposes it would logically appear that
there are, at the time of the new Order of the Com-mission, other presumptive dependents or that evidence
has been offered and received showing that there are other
persons who are dependents in fact.
At the time of the Commission's Order of October
5, 1953, Lloyd Rernund was not within the presumptive
class of dependents as established by Section 35--1--71,
neither had there been a determination of his mental or
physical incapacity or dependency based upon other facts
and circumstances.
It has been suggested by the Industrial Commission
th:J.t because this court has stated in Davis vs. Industrial
Commission, ·109 Utah 87, 164 Pac. 2d, 740, "It is ap-parent that the children have no divisible interest for their
marriage, becoming of age or even death has no effect on
the unit award," that the unit award may not, under any
circumstances be reduced.
We submit that in the Davis case, supra the court
was considering a case in which there were several pre-sumptive dependents at the time the Commission's Order
was made, and under such circumstances, it was proper
that the unit award be left undisturbed.
There are many circumstances under which the so
called unit award may be reduced due to events which
occur subsequent to the original finding of dependency.
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A sole survtvtng widow who later marries receives her
one--third of the unpaid compensation and the balance
lapses. Where there is a surviving wife and a minor child,
who later dies and the wife remarries, a lapse of the
balance of the compensation occurs. The balance lapses
if a sole sun,.iving widow dies before the full amount of
the compensation is paid. Lapses occur when there is no
dependent within the meaning of the Workmen's Com-pensation Act to whom the balance of the compensation
should go.
Appellants' theory that the Industrial Commission
may amend its Order pertaining to the "unit award," is
supported by statute.
Section 35..-1.-78, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro-vides that the Industrial Commission shall have continuing
power to modify and change its former orders and
findings.
.
"35..-1--78. Award - Continuing jurisdiction to
modify.-The powers and jurisdiction of the com..
mission over each case shall be continuing, and it
may from time to time make such modification or
change with respect to former findings, or orders
with respect thereto, as in its opinion may be
justified."
This statutory power of review has been considered
by this court on many occasions. The cases uniformly hold
that the Commission may review or amend its former
orders or findings where there has occurred a substantial
change in the conditions found at the time of the original
order.
In Hardy vs. Industrial Commission of Utah, 89
Utah 561, 58 Pac. 2d 15, 18 the court said with refer.ence to the purpose of the review section set out above.
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"The purpose of section 42--1--72 (now 35--1--70),
supra, is to take care of changed conditions or
developments of some kind justifying a modifica-tion of a previous award. This may be in favor of
the applicants or against him or in favor of the
insurance carrier or against it or him."
A rather complete annotation relating to the modi-fication and review of an award under the above quoted
section of our Workmen's Compensation Law is found
in 165 A.L.R. commencing at Page 108.
To consider that once an order has been made in a
dependency case that the Commission cannot in the proper
case, as changing circumstances may dictate, amend or
alter the original award, is contrary to the theory of modi-fication and review as established by Section 35--1--78. Not
to permit such review and modification, if found proper,
would be in effect to declare a prior order of the Industrial
Commission res adjudicata.
See Carter vs. Industrial Commission, 76 Utah 520,
290 Pac. 776, 781, 782.
"This court further approvingly quoted from the
opinion in the case of Bartlett Hayward Co. vs.
Industrial Accident Commission, 203 Cal. 522,
265, Pac. 195, where, under the California Statute,
which this court stated was similar to our statute,
it was held that, "the power of the Industrial Ac . .
cident Commission as to its continuing jurisdiction
is not limited to consideration of changes in phys-ical condition of workmen, but is extended to right
to rescind, alter, or amend orders, decisions, or
awards on good cause appearing therefor," and
that the doctrine of res adjudicata and other com. .
mon--law doctrines as incorporated in the Code of
Civil Procedure was not applicable to industrial
cases."
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The court, after reviewing other decisions, restated
the law that the doctrine of res adjudicata has no applica ..
tion to industrial cases.
The purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is
to provide for needy dependents as defined by Statute. To
hold that an individual, by reason of the fact that he was
just under eighteen at the time of the original determina ..
tion of dependency is entitled to compensation for years
after he reaches eighteen years of age, without a factual
showing of actual dependency, is inequitable. As an ex..
ample of this point, consider a case in which the depend ..
ents were a surviving wife and one child, aged seventeen
years and 11 months. Under the theory that the award
may not be changed by reason of subsequent changes, if
the wife should remarry within a few weeks or a few
months following the date of the death of her husband,
the surviving child who was only a few days under the
age of eighteen years at the time of his father's death,
would receive compensation until he is over the age of
twenty--three years. In contrast, consider a case in which
the survivor was only a child a day or two over eighteen
years. In the latter case, the child would receive nothing
without evidence as to actual dependency, whereas, the
other child just a few days younger, would receive com..
pensation for several years after reaching the age of
eighteen years without having to present evidence as to
physical or mental incapacity or dependency in fact. The
result would appear to be inequitable and not in accord
with the spirit of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
There appears to be no reason why, given proper
facts, the Commission might not amend its previous orders
made in death cases involving dependency awards.
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B.

In Ordinary Cases Dependency Ceases at Age
Eighteen.

As pointed out in the Statement of Facts, Lloyd Re.mund, the respondent herein, reached eighteen years of
age on the 19th day of December, 1952. At the time of
his mother's remarriage, he was nearly nineteen years of
age and is now past his nineteenth birthday. The re . .
spondent was just under the age of seventeen years at the
time of his father's death. In accordance with the Order
of the Industrial Commission dated October 22, 1951,
compensation was paid to Lottie Remund, the mother of
the respondent and the surviving wife of the deceased,
at the basic compensation rate of $2 7.50 per week plus
an increase of 5% for one dependent child until the re.spondent, Lloyd Remund, reached eighteen years of age,
thereafter, in accordance with the said Order of the Com.mission, the compensation rate was reduced to $27.50
per week. The reduction in the rate of compensation to
be paid after the respondent reached eighteen years of
age was proper and is in accordance with the require.ments of the Workmen's Compensation Act.
Section 35.-1.-74, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, pro.vides as follows:
"Increase of award to children,Effect of death,
marriage, majority, or termination of dependency.
-In all cases where the award of compensation is
increased 5 per cent of the amount of such award
for each dependent minor child, as provided in
this title, such increase in the amount of the award
shall cease at the death, marriage, attainment of
the age of eighteen years, or termination of de.pendency of each such child."
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The above quoted section provides for the termina ..
tion of rhe increase in compensation whenever a child
dependent reaches the age of eighteen years. Although
this section refers only to the increase of 5% allowe i
for dependent children, it is nevertheless persuasive l
the apparent legislative intent in all ordinary cases to con ..
sider children as being dependent only until they reach
the age of eighteen years. The above section was added to
the Workmen's Compensation Act in 1945, which is a
further indication of legislative intent.
The Workmen's Compensation Act is consistent in
that eighteen years of age is used throughout the Work-·
men's Compensation Act as the age at which the pre..
sumption of dependency ceases and the age at which the
increase in compensation is terminated. Section 35.-1.-65,
pertaining to temporary disability; Section 35.-1.-66, per..
taining to partial disability and Section 35.-1.-67, pertain.ing to permanent total disability, contain the identical
provision that compensation should be increased by "5%
of such award for each dependent minor child under the
age of 18 years.. . . ." (emphasis ours).
It is not by ~hance that each section of the Statutes
pertaining to co~~1pensation limits the increase in com.pensation payments only to those cases where the children
are under eighteen years of age. Section 35 .. 1.. 71 specifies
that the presumption of dependency shall apply only to
those children under the age of eighteen years.
"35.-1.-71. Dependents,Presumption.-The follow ..
ing persons shall be presumed to be wholly de ..
pendent for support upon a deceased employee:
" ( 2) Children under the age of eighteen years
or over such age, if physically or mentally in.capacitated, upon the parent, with whom they are
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living at the time of the death of such parent, or
who is legally bound for their support.
"In all other cases, the question of dependency, in
.J
whole or in part, shall be determined in accordance
k
with the facts in each particular case existing at
the time of the injury resulting in the death of
such employee. . . . "
When all the provisions of the Workmen's Com.pensation Act pertaining to the payment of compensation
and the payment of benefits are considered as a whole, it
is clear that the Legislature intended that in all ordinary
cases, compensation for dependent children shall cease
upon those children reaching the age of eighteen years.
C. There Must Be Evidence of Actual Depend ..
ency if Dependency is Claimed for Children
over the Age of Eighteen Years.
If the facts do not bring this case within the pro. .
visions of the first paragraph of subdivision (2) of Sec. .
tion 35.-1.-71, then the fact of dependency cannot be pre. .
sumed from the relationship of parent and child, but must
be determined by facts existing at the time the Commis.sion, as required by Section 35.-1.-73, must determine who
are the "other dependents."
The Utah Supreme Court said in t tah Fuel Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, et al, 80 Utah 301, 15 Pac. 2d
297, 298,
"Dependency is something different from the right
to have support or the duty of a parent to sup.port his children. The word "dependent" ordin . .
arily means the need of aid or support, not self. .
sustaining. A dependent person is one who has
not the means of his own to support himself. A
total dependent is one who has no means whatever
by which to support himself. A partial dependent
is one who has some means but not sufficient for
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his support. Kennedy vs. Keller, 225 Mo. App.
561, 37 S.W. (2d) 452. This definition is not in..
tended to be exclusive. Under other circumstances
and conditions, the definition may be broader.
Utah Galena Corporation vs. Industrial Commis.sion (Utah) SP. (2d) 242. The question of de ..
pendency is one of fact which the commission
must find from evidence introduced before it."
In the case now before this court there is no con.flict in the evidence. Lloyd Remund is over the age of
eighteen years. There is no evidence as to his physical
or mental incapacity nor as to his dependency in fact.
Therefore, as a matter of law, the Industrial Commission
should not have found him to be a dependent and the
decision of the Industrial Commission should be re.versed. The Supreme Court, in the case of Globe Grain
& Milling Co. et al vs. Industrial Commission of Utah,
57 Utah 192, 193 Pac. 642, 643 said,
"As before stated, this court will examine irito
the evidence only to determine whether there is
any substantial competent evidence in support of
the findings of the commission. If there is such
evidence the findings will be sustained, but if there
be no substantial competent evidence to support
the findings this court, on application of the ag..
grieved party, is required to annul the award
which is based on such findings. It is elementary
that if there is no conflict in the evidence and no
conflicting inferences may be drawn therefrom the
question of whether a particular finding is sup.ported by the evidence or not is purely a question
of law. The rule is well stated by the Supreme
Court of Appeals of West Virginia in the head ..
note to the case of Poccardi vs. State Comp.
Com'r, 79 W. Va. 684, 91 S.E. 633, in the follow.ing words:
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"The question of dependency in England and in
this country, under Workmen's Compensation
Law, is one of fact and not of law, to be deter-mined by the evidence in each particular case; but
where the evidence is all certified and there is no
conflict, a question of law, and not of fact, may be
thus presented."
CONCLUSION
We respectfully submit that the Industrial Com-mission was in error in denying appellants' Motion for
Rehearing and in awarding compensation to Lloyd Re-mund. It is respectfully urged that the award of the In-dustrial Commission herein be annulled and set aside.
Respectfully submitted,
CHARLES WELCH, JR.,
JACK FAIRCLOUGH,

Counsel /or Appellants.
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